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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
J. B. WALKER and MARY GOFF
WALKER,
Plaintiffs-Respondents,
vs.
ROCKY MOUNTAIN RECREATION
CORPORATION, a Utah Corporation
(Formerly Old Mill, a Utah Corporation) and J. DOUGLAS BOWERS,
Def endants-Appe Han ts.

Case No.
12,864

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
Suit by promoters and former officers against corporation for balance claimed to be due for cancellation of lease
between promoters and corporation. Current officers
defend on basis of self-dealing, breach of fiduciary duty,
unconscionability, failure to obtain stockholder ratification, and illegal sale of corporate office.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
District Court granted summary judgment in favor of
promotors and former officers and against the corporation
for $14,800.00 due plus a penalty of $10,200.00 (81 % penalty).
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant Rocky Mountain Recreation Corporation
seeks an order vacating the summary judgment and remanding the case for trial on the merits after reasonable
time for discovery.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Walkers who were the owners of the "Old Mill" propery (R. 52, 67) Bowers, who was in the securities business
(R. 69) Gilbert, a contractor (R. 69) and Wray, an accountant (R. 69) promoted and organized Old Mill Corporation and sold a public offering of its stock (R. 64-71).
Prior to organizing the corporation Mrs. Walker leased
the "Old Mill" property to Bowers (R. 54-63), and shortly
after forming the corporation assigned that lease to the
corporation (R. 27). All four of the promoters were officers and directors of the corporation (R. 69) until June
23, 1971, when Walker allegedly ceased to be a director
(R. 37, 52).
Under the terms of the 5 year lease Old Mill Corporation was obligated to pay $67 ,080 plus a percentage of
gross sales to Walker and was obligated to expend $50,000.00 on capital improvements to the leased property,
for a minimum total rental of $117,080.00 (R. 52-63). The
"Old Mill" property was unusable because of lack of
sewer, water, etc. & needed repairs and was never used
by the corporation except to list it asn a asset in the asby the corporaton except to list it as an asset in the
offering circular (R. 46, par. 4). Old Mill Corporation
was unable to pay the lease agreement obligations and
was in default from the inception of the lease. (R. 53)
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Only $1,000.00 cash was invested by the promoters (R.
70), and stock of $10,000.00 was issued to Bowers in exchange for assignment of some earnest money receipts
and of $20,000.00 was issued to Walker in exchange for
assignment to the corporation of the said lease agreement
with Walker, and $9,000.00 of stock as issued to Gilbert
in exchange for contractors services of an indefinite nature to be performed by him in the future. (R. 65-70).
The record does not disclose what happened to the funds
received from selling stock to the public. Approximately
250 persons are stockholders of said corporation. (R. 46,
Par. 3)
Shortly after Walker ceased to be a director (R. 37,
42), the Bowers entered into a contract on behalf of Old
Mill (R. 82-83) wherein Old Mill agreed to pay $16,800.00
to Walker in exchange for cancellation of Walkers original lease with Bowers, which had been assigned to Old
Mill Corporation, and 8 days later the Board of Directors
of Old Mill Corporation, consisting of Bowers, Wray and
Gilbert (R. 37, 52), ratified the said agreement (R. 74).
Two days later the Board of Directors, still consisting of
Bowers, Wray and Gilbert, allegedly adopted a resolution
for Old Mill Corporation to indemnify Bowers against
liability on the Walker transactions and for Old Mill Corporation to defend and to finance the defense of all such
litigation. (R. 40-44). Almost immediately thereafter
the entire Board of Directors resigned (R. 37, 42) in favor
of a new group who purchased their offices in the corporation and took over corporate management.
Two Thousand Dollars was paid on the $16,800.00,
however after new management learned of the circum-
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stances surrounding the execution of the Walker agree- ,
ment they refused to pay the remaining $14,800.00 (R.
45-47), and this lawsuit was commenced.
The Corporate Defendant obtained a copy of the complaint from Bowers who had been served (R.79) and answered on Jan. 25, 1972. Thirteen days later (Feb. 7, 1972)
Walkers moved for summary judgment (R. 51-75) which
was scheduled for hearing nine (9) days later on Feb. 16,
1972, (R. 49). Defendant filed a timely affidavit in opposition to summary judgment (R. 45-47), however summary judgment was granted (R. 22-23, 48). Defendant's
motion for a new trial or to correct findings, conclusions
and judgment (R. 20-21) was denied (R. 8), and this appeal was taken.
1

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT LACKED JURISDICTION TO GRANT
SUMMARY JUDGMENT BECAUSE OF INSUFFICIENT NOTICE
Rule 56 ( c) , RCP, pertaining to a motion for summary
judgment, provides in part as follows:
"The motion shall be served at least 10 days before
the time fixed for hearing .... "
Rule 6(e), URCP, provides as follows:
"Whenever a party has the right or is required to
do some act or take some proceedings within a prescribed period after the service of a notice or other
paper upon him and the notice or paper is served
upon him by mail, 3 days shall be added to the prescribed period."

'

'
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The motion for summary judgment (R. 51-75) was mailed
by counsel for Plaintiffs on February 7, 1972, (R. 49-50),
which is only 9 days before the hearing of that motion on
February 16, 1972, (R. 22-23, 48). The time required for
notice of a motion for summary judgment is 10 days
(Rule 56(c), URCP, supra) plus an additional 3 days
because that notice was mailed (Rule 6(e), URCP, supra), for a total of 13 days. Acordingly the notice of hearing fixed the date of the hearing 4 days short of the
required time and precluded the Court for hearing the
matter and from awarding summary judgment at that
hearing. Defendant might not object so much to the
shortness of the notice of hearing of that motion, however
when viewed in light of the shortness of time since the
filing of the complaint (Jan. 12, 1972) (R. 80), since the
filing of Defendant's answer (Jan. 25, 1972), (R. 76-77),
it is obvious that Defendant was not given a reasonable
opportunity to interview witnesses, obtain affidavits, submit interrogatories, take depositions, and to otherwise
prepare to defend this lawsuit. The above quoted rules
were adopted to protect against such summary disposition of litigation and should be strictly enforced.
POINT II
DEFENDANT WAS DENIED PROCEDURAL DUE
PROCESS BY BEING DENIED A REASONABLE OPPORTUNITY TO PREPARE FOR TRIAL AND TO ENGAGE IN DISCOVERY PROCEDURE.
Only 13 days elapsed between the mailing by Defendant of its answer to Plaintiff and the filing of Plaintiff's
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motion for summary judgment (R. 75-77). Rule 1, URCP
provides in part as follows:
'
" .... They shall be liberally construed to secure the
just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every
action."
·
Rules 26-37, URCP, provide for discovery through interrogatories, requests for admissions, depositions, production of documents, etc., which obviously contemplates
that a reasonable time will be allowed for such procedures. Even if interrogatories had been submitted with
the answer the Plaintiffs would not have been required
to answer those interrogatories until 5 days after hearing
of the motion for summary judgment. The management
of the Defendant corporation was only in office for a short
time before commencement of this lawsuit and accordingly was quite unfamiliar with the transactions out of which
the claim of Plaintiff's arose and was at a disadvanatage
in not having readily available facts with which to properly defend this lawsuit. (R. 76-77; 20-21).
POINT III
THE COURT ERRED IN AWARDING JUDGMENT
FOR A PENALTY OF $10,200.00 FOR NON-PAYMENT
OF A $14,800.00 OBLIGATION (81 % )
The Walker agreement which is the subject matter of
this lawsuit provides for a $25,000.00 judgment in the
event that Old Mill Corporation failed to pay $16,800.00
within the times required under the terms of this contract
(R. 82-83). Two Thousand Dollars of that obligation was
paid leaving an unpaid balance of $14,800.00. The Court
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enforced that unconscionable penalty provision (R. 22-23,
48) notwithtanding the obvious unfairness of the agree:..
ment and the obvious self dealing by corporate officers
(R. 45-47; 76-77). Defendant was entitled to a jury trial
and/or to trial by a court of equity concerning the unconscionable and/or inequitable nature of and enforceability
of that penalty. The net effect of enforcement of the
penalty was to require payment of 81 % additional by
reason of the delay in payment, clearly a penalty. That
exclusive measure of damages for detention of money is
interest. Croft v. Jensen, 86 U. 13, 40 P.2d 198 at page 202.
Where, as in our case, a contract calls for payment of
money, an agreement to pay a sum certain in case of default is usually construed as an agreement for a penalty,
and not liquidated damages. Reed v. Armstrong, 312 P.2d
77, 6 U. (2d) 291. A provision for a penalty in the event
of a breach of contract is unenforceable. Russell v. Ogden
Union Railway & Depot Company, 247 P.2d 257, 122 U.
107.
An issue of fact as to whether the provision for payment of the additional $10,200.00 is a penalty or a provision for liquidated damages, which issue precludes
summary judgment.
POINT IV
PLAINTIFFS' CLAIM ARISE FROM AN ILLEGAL
SALE OF SUBSTANTILLY ALL OF THE ASSETS OF
THE CORPORATE DEFENDANT AND IS UNENFORCEABLE
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Utah Corporation law provides elaborate safeguards
against sale by officers or directors of substantially all of
the assets of a corporation, including the following requirements imposed by 16-10-74, UCA, 1953:
(a) A resolution of board of directors recommending
the sale and directing submission thereof to a vote of the
shareholders.
(b) A written notice to each shareholder of the time
and place of the meeting of shareholder, stating that one
of the purposes of that meeting is to consider the proposed sale of assets.
( c) Affirmative vote of a majority of all outstanding
shares of stock of the corporation.
In our case the officers and directors wholly failed to
comply with any of the above mentioned requirements.
Bowers as president entered into a contract for disposition of substantially all of the assets of the corporate
defendant Sept. 1, 1971, (R. 43-43), which agreement was
ratified 8 days later (R. 74) by the board of directors
(with Bowers voting although the contract relieved him
of personal liability to Walkers). The Board of Directors
had no power to enter into a contract to dispose of said
assets, but only the power to recommend sale to the stockholders as provided by 1-10-74, UCA, 1953. No notice
was ever sent to stockholders and no stockholders meeting was ever held to act upon the proposed sale of assets
(R. 74)
In the event that Plaintiffs contend that the Walker
contract did not result in disposition of substantially all
of the assets of the Corporate Defendant within the mean-
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ing of 16-10-74, UCA, 1953, then an issue of fact exists
concerning that matter which requires a trial, and accordingly requires reversal of the summary judgment
and remanding of the matter for trial.
POINT V
DISPUTED ISSUES OF FACT PRECLUDED GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT
The corporate Defendant admits the agreement which
is the subject matter of this lawsuit was executed by
former officers and that if that agreement is enforceable
it is indebted to Plaintiffs in some amount, however the
pleadings, affidavits and other documents on file in this
case contain disputed issues of fact which entitle the
Corporate Defendant to a trial, including but not limited
to the following:
1. Dispute as to whether the Walker agreement which
is the subject matter of this lawsuit constituted a disposition of subtantially all of the assets of the corporation
within the meaning of 16-10-74, (UCA, 1953, and thereby
required the affirmative vote of a majority of the outstanding stock at a meeting called for that purpose. See
disscussion under point IV above.
2. Dispute as to whether the 81 % penalty imposed by
contract upon Defendant for delay in payment constituted
enforceable liquidated damage clause or prohibited penalty provision. See discussion under point III above.
3. Dispute as to whether the disclosure in the prospectus (R. 64-71) of self-dealing, unconscionable contracts between the corporation and its officers and direc-
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tors, issuance of stock without reasonable consideration ,
etc. is sufficient to insulate those officers and directors
from the usual corporate liability for such transactions ,
particularly where the record fails to disclose ratification or approval of those transactions by the stockholders
of the corporation and repudiation by new officers after
learning of self-dealing. It should also be remembered
that the only purported adoption by the corporation of
the Walker lease contract before the court at the time
that the summary judgment was granted was the statements in the affidavit of Walker to the effect that the
lease had been listed as an asset in the offering circular
(R. 53). See also statement of facts on page L above for
details concerning the unconscionable lease agreement,
issuance of stock for inadequate consideration, and the
agreement to pay $16,800.00 to terminate that lease
agreement.
The law generally permits a corporation to adopt a
promoters contract if that contract is beneficial, reasonable and made in good faith. Un. German Silver Co. v.
Bronson, 102 A. 647; Fletcher, Cyc Corp., P. 808, Sec 208.
An issue of fact exists as to the power of the Corporate
Defendant to ratify or adopt the agreements in question
in view of the questions concerning whether or not said
contracts were (a) beneficial to the corporation, (b)
reasonable in view of the circumstances, and ( c) were
made in good faith by the officers, directors and promoters.
4. Dispute as to whether the act of the corporation
constituted a ratification of the Bower-Walker lease and
of the later Bower-Walker agreement to which required
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the corporation to pay $16,800.00 to Walker, particularly
in view of the self-dealing by officers, directors and promoters, and purported ratification by board consisting
only of those officers, directors and promoters.
Defendant's answer (R. 76-77) and affidavit in opposition to the motion for summary judgment (R. 45-47)
created issues of fact concerning the foregoing matters
and precluded awarding of summary judgment. A motion
for summary judgment is, in effect, a demurrer to the
contentions of the adverse party and states that, conceding the facts to be as claimed by the adversary, there is
no basis for the other party to prevail in the lawsuit.
Auto Lease Co. v. Central Mut. Ins. Co., 325 P.2d 264,
7 U. (2d) 366; Samms v. Eccles, 358 P.2d 344, 11 U. (2d)
289. Summary judgment should be granted only when,
taking the view most favorable to the claims of the party
against whom summary judgment is sought, and any
proof that might be adduced thereunder, he could in no
event prevail. Kidman v. White, 278 P.2d 898, 14 U. (2d)
142. If a dispute exists as to any issue of fact which would
be determinative of rights of the parties, summary judgment should be denied. Transamerica Title Ins. Co. v.
United Resources, Inc., 471 P.2d 165, 24 U. (2d) 346. Summary judgment is a drastic remedy and should be granted
with reluctance. Housley v. Anaconda Co., 427 P.2d 870,
17 U. (2d) 420.
Issues of fact exist which preclude summary judgment
and entitle the defendant to a trial.
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SUMMARY
Summary judgment was improperly granted against
defendant for balance claimed to be owed under terms of
agreement between corporation and its officers, direcors
and promoters for the following reasons:

1. Court lacked jurisdiction since hearing on motion
for summary judgment was held 4 days before earliest
time allowed by Rules 56 ( c) and 6 ( e), URCP. (Point I)
2. Hearing of motion for summary judgment filed 13
days after and heard 22 days after answer was filed
denied procedural due process and denied Defendant a
reasonable time to engage in discovery procedure and to
prepare for trial, particularly where current officers had
no knowledge concerning transactions between corporation and its prior officers, which transactions were the
subject matter of suit. (Point II)
3. Issues of fact established by Defendant's answer
(R. 76-77) and by affidavit in opposition to motion for
summary judgment (R. 45-47) precluded summary judgment, including issues as to:
(a) Whether the transaction which was the subject
matter of the lawsuit was void as a disposition of substantially all of the assets of the corporation without
stockholder approval as required by 16-10-74, UCA, 1953.
(Point IV).
(b) Whether the contract was unconscionable or
otherwise void and unenforceable by reason of inclusion
therein of a penalty of 81 % of the obligation in the event
of non-payment within the time specified, particularly in
view of issues of fact concerning alleged self-dealing
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corporate officers, directors and promoters in making
that contract. (Point III)
( c) Whether or not the disclosures contained in the
prospectus were sufficient to insulate the officers, directors and promoter from personal liability for their alleged
self-dealing with and unconscionable contracts with corporation, particularly where the purported ratification
was by a board of directors consisting of those persons.
This appears to be a classic case of promoters selling
stock to the public, causing the corporation to enter into
contracts with the promoters which are unfair to the
corporation, then bailing out and leaving the stockholders
with little or no assets. The new management seeks to
prevent the former officers from taking further assets
from the corporation, and to have those agreements declared void. To affirm the summary judgment would be
to leave the stockholders who purchased stock in good
faith without a remedy. Justice requires that they be
given a reasonable opportunity to engage in discovery and
to present their evidence at a trial. The summary judgment entered herein should be reversed and the case
should be remanded for trial.
Respectifully submitted,

RONALD C. BARKER
Attorney for
Defendant-Appellant
2870 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115
Telephone 486-9636

